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LESSONS FROM RESUSCITATING Two HIGH
TECH VENTURES
KENNETH G. HARDY*
Highly technical business start-ups are frequently expensive
and risky. This article describes how two entrepreneurial
"tech" projects were pulled back from the brink of disaster
by entrepreneurs who understood how their customers
wanted to buy, the benefits they wanted, and the functions
that the organization could outsource rather than make in-
house. These two cases may help readers understand the
nature of the risks facing early-stage ventures, particularly
the risks of misinterpreting market wants and needs. It may
also assist lawyers who are serving new high-tech ventures
to identify gaps in the entrepreneur's market understanding
and bring these blind spots to the attention of the
entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs and others who become skilled
at rescuing imperiled ventures make a significant social and
economic contribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Venture capitalists have learned from hundreds of new high-tech
ventures to expect a range of successes. From any ten projects, one is likely
to exceed expectations, two or three will meet expectations, three or four
will survive but not meet expectations, and three or four will go bankrupt.1
Any entrepreneur who can improve the chances of success for an early-
stage venture makes a useful contribution to the economic health of the
country. The collapse of a venture wastes the efforts of the original
entrepreneur in marshalling the resources, including the people, the patents,
the technology, the systems, and all the legal work that is required to
establish a venture. To be sure, some assets from failed ventures are
occasionally salvaged for other new ventures, but the unique-in-time-
opportunity has been foregone. Better management could save some
projects from bankruptcy. Here are two cases in point.
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II. CASE 1 - EJUST
eJust is a software program and database used by police services in
Ontario to lay criminal charges and carry them from a police department
into and through the courts. eJust replaces paper charge systems that
require a police officer's selection of proper charge documents, completion
of multiple documents by hand, and the reproduction of many elements of
those original documents as police charges are transformed into court
charges. The hand/paper system is laborious, time consuming, and error-
prone because of the many opportunities to lay an incorrect charge or make
copying errors.2 With eJust, the police officer merely types in the nature of
the specific criminal offence, the age of the defendant, date of the alleged
offence, and one or two other pertinent facts. The software program then
draws up the correct charges on the correct forms for the officer's signature
3
and further processing.
For eighteen years, four entrepreneurs in London, Ontario, had been
developing and supporting a variety of software applications for local
businesses which yielded steady income but failed to offer an opportunity
beyond selling their engineering time. They thought that a software product
could be developed around one specialized but widely-used application to
earn a large amount of revenue. The concept for eJust was developed in
1993. 4
eJust required a major investment in the software developer's
learning about the intricacies of the Ontario police and court services. The
founders also had to develop a charge template and a major database that
contained the appropriate charges to be laid for a given age of an offender
for a particular offense in a particular year. The large database was required
because criminal charges are modified by changing legislation over the
years, and being charged as a youth is different from being charged as an
adult. There were several thousand potential charges that a police officer
might have to file, but eighty percent of charges involve twenty percent of
those potential offenses.' The eJust automated charge system was shown to
reduce the time required to prepare a set of charges by up to two-thirds of
the time required to file the same charges using standard paper forms.0
The first demonstrations of eJust for the London, Ontario police
services brought rave reviews from the front line officers who were using it.
The chief of police at the time was generally acknowledged to be an
innovator in many aspects of policing, and he fully supported the
experiment with the new charge system. However, it was the front line
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officers who valued the accuracy of laying and carrying the charges through
the court system. With paper systems, aggressive defense attorneys
delighted in embarrassing police officers who had made even a tiny clerical
error in transcribing charge sheets, and defendants frequently were
acquitted based on these minor technical errors.7 A study in a nearby city
of Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, found that police officers experienced
more stress in preparing court forms than in dealing with brawls. 8
The founders of eJust quickly expanded the eJust trials into other
cities in Ontario. They focused their selling efforts to police chiefs on
showing that the system could save officer's charging time. In fact, the
founders suggested that the chiefs could reduce the number of officers and
save money, or divert those officers to non-policing tasks. Each adaptation
of the original system for a particular city's police force required a
significant investment for eJust in time, installation, and training - usually
in the realm of $100,000, which the founders proposed to charge to the
particular police service and the municipality. 9 The complexities required
an eighteen-page contract and the approval of the local city council and
chief financial officer.' 0
Despite more rave reviews from front line police officers in the four
small cities that adopted eJust, the founders did not sell any eJust systems to
the large cities such as Toronto, Hamilton, Windsor, and Ottawa." Each of
the police forces in these cities already had large Information Technology
("IT") departments.12  The sight of a large investment in IT always
provoked the discussion about doing the work in-house. Although these
departments eventually concluded that eJust truly contained proprietary
technology, the momentum to experiment with eJust frequently had been
lost by the time they reached this conclusion. 3 Moreover, police chiefs
generally were not well versed in the leverage available from new software.
eJust founders also participated in a three-year province-wide
attempt to modernize the information technology of the police and justice
systems in the province.' 4 Unfortunately, this complex private/public joint
venture ended in little progress and plenty of recriminations for all who
participated. An attempt to bring in a more sales-oriented CEO leader also
failed, and the eJust system was a big disappointment to the labor-backed
venture fund that had bought a majority share of the equity from the four
founders.' 5 The eJust organization languished for three years with just
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enough revenue to keep it from going bankrupt, and most of that revenue
came from projects other than eJust.16
In 2003, the labor venture fund managers placed a new CEO in the
eJust organization and told him to put it up for sale.' The best offer he
received over several months was less than the venture fund's investment
and less than its estimate of the organization's value. The fund managers
then told the new CEO to see if he could fix the revenue and profit problem.
The new CEO began calling on existing and potential customers. He found
that the chiefs of police were indeed the main persons to determine the
purchase. However, they did not value time savings that would reduce their
police force; if anything, they wanted to build the size of the police force.' 8
The main value for them was the system's accuracy. Moreover the police
chiefs disliked investment spending that required complex legal documents
and a year of wrangling with elected officials. What they wanted was a
system that could be budgeted as an annual fixed cost, preferably on an
annual per officer basis to make it easy to justify.1 9
eJust's new CEO used the new information to revise the selling and
marketing approach. The investment became a multi-year user contract
written on three pages rather than eighteen, and it was priced at $100 per
officer per year. 20 There was no longer any need for municipal review. The
new CEO added two full time sales people. Within six months, he and his
sales team had sold several major cities in the province; fifty percent of the
police officers in Ontario began using eJust. 21 Annual revenue jumped to
almost $1 million and the organization was launched on a success track
with new opportunities in other provinces and other countries.22
There may be several lessons to be derived from the eJust story. It
was important to understand each police chief s most important motivation
and desired purchase process. The elust organization had to borrow money
to finance installations in each new city, but it simplified the purchase
process for police chiefs. The founding technicians suffered from lack of
experience in selling software systems. The new CEO had substantial
experience in selling software to businesses, and he was able to leverage
that experience to sell eJust. As a result, the labor fund was pleased to
make a reasonable return on its investment. It was finally able to move
eJust from the near bankruptcy list to the 'more-than-meeting-expectations'
list.
III. CASE 2- QUACK.COM
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Quack.com was a public voice portal that was founded in 1998 in
California to provide quick and easy (voice) access to the benefits of the
Web. 23 Quack.com advertised a toll-free telephone number that one could
call and ask, "What is the weather in [city]?" and the caller would soon
receive a voice answer derived from a Web source. z4 Other typical
applications would be to find a restaurant, a service station, or perhaps an
answer to a more general question-anything that utilized information
available from the Web.2 5 The founders believed that the convenience of
using voice commands was a major advantage over using a computer
directly to make those same inquiries.26  They thought that travelers,
21particularly people driving in their cars, would be major users.
Quack.com trialed the service on March 31, 2000, to become the
first public voice portal in the world and opened a nationwide service on
April 10, hours before their Tellme Networks competitor.28 The original
business plan intended for revenues to be derived from advertising and
sponsorship of the public voice portal, commissions from sales purchased
through the voice portals, development fees for creating third party voice
29portals, and a licensing fee for the Quack software suite.
Quack.com founders recognized that the voice service required
Quack.com to provide five functions in order to make the service work.
First, Quack had to tell potential customers that the service existed.
Second, they needed to provide an access point-a telephone number to
call, preferably a free call. Third, the voice command had to be translated
into a command that a Web search service could understand, then the
browser had to find the answer and finally translate it back into language
for the waiting customer. Quack's technology was focused on the third,
fourth and fifth functions, but it still needed to attract customers and
provide telephone access for the service to be used. Quack had no
particular competencies in the first two functions - and the first two
functions were far and away the most expensive to deliver!
Quack.com spent millions advertising its existence, benefits and
telephone number, but found relatively few subscribers and few interested
30advertisers. Unfortunately, the technicians in the company resisted efforts
to move from a public voice portal to a more particular business portal
offering voice services for particular applications such as a call centre, a
bank, etc., even though these applications looked like they were within
23 BENJI SHOMAIR & KENNETH G. HARDY, STRATEGIC DIRECTION AT QUACK.COM 1
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technical reach and offered high value. 3' For the technical people, the
magic and the excitement was to make voice recognition searches available
32to the masses. For the founders, there was just three month's funding
remaining when they made their final choice of business model and future
activity. 33  The founders could re-focus the company on a particular
business application, sell to their competitor, Tellme, look for other
strategic buyers, or sell Quack.com to a labor venture fund at a very low
price that would not begin to recoup the original investment.
34
The potential strategic buyers were firms that could perform the
first two functions - awareness creation and telephone line provision-
better than Quack. For example, the founders reasoned that Verizon or
AT&T might be suitable buyers because they were already telephone
carriers, their telephone line costs would be low, and they might use a
ready-made voice recognition service to automate service inquiries.
Another set of strategic buyers were the Web browser firms such as Yahoo,
Lycos and America Online ("AOL"). None of them offered voice
recognition as part of the service, except for Quack.com's small contract
with Lycos that effectively prevented them from teaming up with either
AOL or Yahoo.3 5
The Quack.com situation was made worse by the fact that their
main competitor, Tellme, had just linked itself with AT&T for $50 million
36in service in kind. Further, Quack.com was unable to raise a second round
of financing, but both Tellme and BeVocal, another competitor, had
succeeded in doing So. 37 The Quack.com founders were feeling that they
were at a distinct disadvantage-and they feared they might lose their
investment. 38 However, in the summer of 2000, the Quack.com founders
jettisoned the small contract with Lycos, and in September, they announced
the sale of Quack.com to AOL by Phone for a fairly handsome valuation.
There are several lessons one might take from the Quack.com
experience. It is useful to test the business model for functionality. Small
start-ups are safer to stay within their own competencies and to partner with
other firms to supply their missing competencies, especially when the other
functions make up the bulk of the cost of the service. They need to be able
to answer the tough business questions such as the following: Do drivers
really want to be able to make general inquiries, and do they want to keep a
telephone number on hand for this purpose? How would this general voice
service compete with the more specific applications such as General
" Id. at 7.
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Motor's OnStar safety, map routing, and concierge services? Yes, there is a
certain magic in being able to make commands and leverage the great
search power of the Web, but who needs it? If few need it, why would
advertisers pay to advertise on the medium? How would it work for
telephone services-ads while you wait? Who wants to wait? Some may
consider that the Quack.com founders were fortunate to sell to AOL as a
strategic exit and derive a high valuation on the enterprise.
IV. SUMMARY
Many high tech ventures initiated in the 1990s continue to survive
as parts of other companies, or in some cases, as free-standing
organizations. In these two cases, the founders were enraptured by the
promise of benefits from the technology. Both sets of founders
miscalculated the market wants, and thus could not provide revenue as
expected. Both were missing at least one of the core competencies required
to provide the total service they offered. Both eventually found a form of
success, but only after significant tribulations.
Who else might have assisted these founders during the early stages
of these tech firms? Some of the trusted advisors in the early stages are the
venture funds themselves who usually provide depth of industry experience
and consulting advice for their investments. Many early stage firms hire an
experienced executive to help collect and protect the intellectual property,
and such a person might have been able to ask some questions about the
business model. Most start-ups use legal services that might be able to ask
some useful questions about the markets and the business model. Clearly,
the business plans for these firms needed more depth and verification. It
may seem trite, but there is no substitute for industry experience in
conducting start-ups. Students studying these cases frequently remark that
the real culprit was the ease of funding tech ventures during the heady days
of the dot.com boom, and that those days will never return. Those
comments from young observers make for a very interesting discussion!
How could lawyers help to avoid failures in new ventures or to help
resuscitate them? Although legal advice cannot be expected to offer direct
answers to market questions, lawyers serving start-ups should gain valuable
experience over time. Perhaps the best thing they can advise is what we
learned in a first course in contract law: When a project is significant and
you lack critical experience, hire it!
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